metaethics which replaced his earlier objectivist theory and which he held in various forms for most of the rest of his life. But few know of the curious metaethical view which he brieXy held in 1922 and which has since become known as "error theory"-a theory according to which our ethical judgments are cognitively meaningful but false. In what follows I wish to examine Russell's error theory to understand what the theory was, some current objections to it, and why he so quickly discarded it. We shall see that the new theory relies heavily on insights imported from Russell's 1905 theory of denoting. I shall draw attention to some overlooked details of the 1922 theory that render it invulnerable to several recent lines of attack. In the course of our examination, we shall gain a clearer picture of the theory's role in the evolution of Russell's metaethics and also a clearer picture of what Russell himself likely saw as its shortcomings as an analysis of moral language.
Russell never published his little (two-page) paper on error theory, "Is There an Absolute Good?", but he did present it before a special session of the secret Cambridge Apostles Society on 4 March 1922.
2 And he presented it, with the help of his by then famous theory of descriptions, partly as an attack on Moore and his own earlier objectivist metaethics heavily inXuenced by Principia Ethica. What Russell does in the paper, in eTect, is to sketch a metaethical theory which preserves Moore's "absolutist" insights about the nature of the meaningz of our value language without having to be committed to an ontology of moral facts containing any Moorean non-natural properties, viz. good and bad.
Russell charges Moore (and, by implication, himself circa 1903) with a fallacy, viz. that the term "good", as used by the Moorean absolutists, is not the name of a special property at all. Rather it is a description, a truncated incomplete symbol, purporting to denote such a property, and when properly analyzed, Russell tells us, "all propositions in which the 3 Russell on Ethics, p. 122; Papers 9: 345. Interestingly, Moore was present at the 4 March meeting, although there is no known record of his reaction. Typically, those present at the Apostles' meetings would record their vote (Yes or No) on the question and often add a pithy comment in justiWcation. These votes and comments are consistent with the thesis of Russell's paper. Moore, along with Braithwaite (elected 1921) and Ramsey (also 1921), did vote "Yes" on the question. Russell voted "No", adding "But no one is better"z-za statement literally true if there is no such property as good. Lionel Penrose (elected 1920) also voted "No", adding "Because he [Goldie] does not exist; though I believe he does"z-za remark a propos of Russell's Theory of Descriptions and his non-existent bald French monarch. 4 Russell's (and Moore's) use of "predicate" may easily be misunderstood. He uses it to mean non-linguistic objects, i.e. concepts or properties.
word 'good' has a primary occurrence are false." 3 In order to help explain the contextual meaning of this truncated description ("good") , Russell gives what he takes to be the genesis of our notion of "goody" as follows:
We have emotions of approval and disapproval. If A, B, C, … are the things towards which we have emotions of approval, we mistake the similarity of our emotions in the presence of A, B, C, … for perception of a common predicate of A, B, C, …. To this supposed predicate we shall give the name "good".
[But] … the predicate "good" is not to belong to anything of which we disapprove.
He continues with his explication of our value judgments:
A, B, C, … are things of which we approve; X, Y, Z, … are the things of which we disapprove. We judge: "There is a predicate possessed by A, B, C, … but not by X, Y, Z, …." To this supposed predicate, so described, we give the name "good".
( (1N) is false. Rather it allows us to give our statement (1) an "absolutist" meaning even if it is false. And the fact that we take "good" as an incomplete symbol allows us to do just that, since, on the theory of descriptions, incomplete symbols do not have to mean (denote or name) anything in order to occur meaningfully in our statements. So on this new error theory we do not have to countenance any objective Moorean properties in order to account for the absolutist meaning of our value statements.
Of course, Moore and the earlier Russell might not be completely happy with this account of the genesis of our notion of "goody" precisely because it makes goodz knowable, if it is knowable at all, only indirectly by description. Principia Ethicaz 's metaethics was closely connected with the idea that good was cognizable directly, by acquaintance as Russell might have said. "Good" was the name of a special property.
But this Principia Ethica idea was, Russell later came to think, an illusion fostered by a naive semantics. In fact Russell says in 1922 that Moore's fallacy in 1903 had sprung from an unduly simplistic theory of denoting. As Russell explains:
Without the theory of incomplete symbols, it seemed natural to infer, as Moore did, that, since propositions in which the word "good" occurs have meaning, therefore the word "good" has meaning; but this was a fallacy. And it is upon this fallacy, I think, that the most apparently cogent of Moore's arguments rest.
(Russell on Ethics, p. 123; Papersz 9: 345)
We might reconstruct this fallacy as a complex argument for the existence of the property goodz :
7 See "On Denoting", LK, pp. 55-6; Papers 4: 427-7. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 11 (1910-11): 108-28; MLz; Papers 6. 8 For an analysis and defence of Russell's account of the meaninglessness of deWnite descriptions, see my "Incomplete Symbols in Principia Mathematicaz and Russell's 'DeWnite Proofy'z", Russellz 31 (2011): 29-37; also "Why 'On Denoting '?", ibid., 27 (2007): 33-9. 9 In Russell's analysis of value statements, "the so-and-so" purports to denote the property good, and "Fy" the property of being instantiated by M. Argument i (2) "M is good" has meaning. (3) Therefore, "good" has a meaning.
Argument ii (3) "Good" has a meaning. (4) Therefore, there is a property which "good" means. By Russell's theory of descriptions, if we treat "good" as a description à la (1N) above, (3) doesn't follow from (2) even though (2) is true. Recall that on Russell's 1905 theory of denoting, descriptions, unlike names, do not stand for meaning components (either individuals or properties) in the corresponding expressed propositions, although they mayz have denotations.
7 Thus Argument i is no better than Argument iN (2N) "The present king of France is bald" has meaning. (3N) Therefore, "the present king of France" has a meaning.
But Russell is quite clear that "the present king of France", like all deWnite descriptions, has no meaning; nor does it have a denotation.
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The lesson here is that the meaningfulness of "The so-and-so is Fz z "z -z whether "the so-and-so" purports to denote an individual or a property-is no guarantee of there being any such entity.
9 So, Argument i is invalid. And thus Argument ii is not cogent, i.e. its soundness, and hence its conclusion (4), is doubtful.
But a fallacious argument doesn't have to have a false conclusion. So why did Russell come to think it untrue that there was such a property as the Moorean goody? The answer is that, apart from not discovering any convincing arguments for the existence of such a property, there were 10 See Russell on Ethics, p. 117 (Papers 13: 326), where Russell, in a 1916 letter to the Cambridge Magazine, replies to a critic (T.yE. Hulme) and aUrms that he (Russell) has abandoned belief in the objectivity of ethics in large part because he "cannot imagine any argument" for proving the truth of judgments of intrinsic value. Also see ibid., p. 142, where Russellz-zby now (1935) a full-blown emotivistz -zreaUrms (from Chapter 9 of his Religion and Sciencez) "the complete impossibility" of such arguments. , 1965; 1st edn., 1912] , p. 63.) Pigden appears not to have noticed that, as Russell implies in his Wrst reason for accepting the new theory, he apparently believed that his error theory was notz vulnerable to the "no subject of dispute" doubts raised by the problem of seemingly unresolvable disagreements over intrinsic value. 10 One might well think that if good were a real objective property, then disputes over whetherz Mz is good ought to be resolvable as most disputes in science are, by appeal to logic and experience. But at least equally important are the Wve reasons given by Russell in his 1922 paper for accepting the error theory.
11 His reasons (2)-(4) amount to the observation that since we judge "Mz is good" (or "Mz is bad") if and only if we have the emotions of approval (or disapproval) towards M, and since we disagree in our ethical judgments to the same extent to which we diTer in our emotions of approval and disapproval, we don't make any practical gain in assuming that there are such absolutist properties as the Moorean goodz and badz over and above these emotions. Hence his Wfth reasonz -z an appeal to Occam's Razor: if we don't need to assume Moorean properties to account for the meaning of our value judgments and for their practical use, we ought not to do so. Their existence is at least unlikely, and belief in them unwarranted.
First objection: the problem of "no subject of debate"
Pigden's main objection in Russell on Ethicsz can be stated as a reductio ad absurdum to the eTect that Russell's error theory has the unacceptable consequence that obviously contradictory value judgments (such as "Mz is good" and "Mz is bad") may not really contradict one another.
12 Pigden reminds us that Russell himself once pointed out, as his main reason for rejecting subjectivism, that it rendered our moral disagreements over M as mere statements of our own divergent feelings, with the absurd consequence that "there would be no subject of debate" between us. But, says Pigden, this is just what Russell's error theory allows.
objection. He says, "… the arguments which he [Moore] brings against the rival theories … do not apply against it" (p. 123; Papersz 9: 346).
Suppose I say "Mz is good" and you say "Mz is bad". On Russell's analysis, I'm saying:
(5) There is a property (call it "goody") common to things (A, B, C, …) that I approve of and which Mz instantiates.
You are saying:
(6) There is a property (call it "bady") common to things (X, Y, Z, …) that you disapprove of and which M instantiates.
Pigden says that, although both (5) and (6) will be false on Russell's theory, they may still be compatible, "For a thing might possess both the property common to A, B, C, …, andz the property common to X, Y, Z, … (if there were such propertiesz )" (p. 22, my emphasis). And he concludes:
But, "M is good" said by me and "M is bad" said by you plainly do contradict each other, whatever we respectively approve and disapprove of. Hence, the analysis is false.
(Russell on Ethics, p. 22)
There are several points to make here. If we ignore Russell's Wrst reason for accepting his theory (see n.13), we might think that Pigden might be correct that this alleged feature of Russell's error theory violates a primary desideratum for a satisfactory metaethical theory for the early Russell (and Moore). But this may not be a fair criticism of Russell in 1922. Russell could surely reply that his (and Moore's) earlier account of value judgments was metaphysically and epistemically gratuitous, and his 1922 account avoids that mistake while preserving the objectivist meaning of our ordinary value talk; and that the account yields the added beneWt of allowing us to see that our ethical disagreements, while real, are not genuine contradictions, much like the analysis of denotationless descriptions in Russell's 1905 theory. When I say:
(7) The present king of France is bald, And you say:
14 Pigden raises this objection in his 2007 article "Russell's Moral Philosophy", http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-moral/, sec. 8. 15 If we take the analysis to be providing a deWnitez description for good, the existence of multiple properties will make all value judgments false, just as the existence of Russell and Whitehead makes both "The author of Principia Mathematicaz was mortal" and "The author of Principia Mathematica was not mortal" false. In the case of (5) and (6), Russell might similarly say there is no strict contradiction; both statements are false. And certainly we do have a disagreement (in attitude) in our emotions towards M. But do we really, in (5) and (6), have a situation similar to (7) and (8) regarding the supposed properties we attribute to Mz z ? Would their instantiation by Mz be impossible were they to exist in the same way that the king of France, were he to exist, could not possibly be both bald and not bald? Is Pigden not correct that they might both be instantiated by Mz z ? But if so, Russell's analysis contravenes a plain fact of our moral discourse, viz. that "Mz is good" and "Mz is bad" doz contradict. Thus, Pigden concludes that Russell's error theory analysis is inadequate and should be rejected.
The problem of multiple properties
I think Pigden's alleged refutation of Russell's analysis rests on an oversight concerning Russell's guidelines for deWning the incomplete symbol, which I shall point out, but I Wrst want to raise a related criticism: how can Russell be conWdent that the supposed property does not exist?
14 After all, it seems that all our objects of approval do share some properties, e.g. that of being in space and time. And surely they all share the property of being approved by us. There plausibly are multiple such properties common to our objects of approval, all capable of rendering our value judgments true. Thus it would seem, pacez Russell, that judgments like (5) above would be true, not false. 16 Russell on Ethics, p. 122; Papers 9: 345. My italics, except for "ally".
It may be that A, B, C, … will have several common predicates, but the irrelevant ones can be eliminated by the rule that the predicate "good" is not to belong to anything of which we diszapprove.
(Russell on Ethics, p. 123; Papers 9: 345)
Let's call this:
Russell's Elimination Rule 1z : The predicate good is not to belong to anything of which we disapprove.
It's clear that this rule (which Pigden never mentions) will eliminate some candidates for "good", e.g. the property of being in space-time, since some of our objects of disapproval would surely have this property. But unfortunately it won't (at least not obviously) eliminate the property of being an object of our approval. All our objects of approval, and apparently none of our objects of disapproval, instantiate that property. What is obviously needed is another elimination rule that will unambiguously describe the sort of property that Moorean absolutists took goodz to be. A close reading of Russell suggests just such a rule.
On the Wrst page of his 1922 paper, he says that he wants an analysis of value judgments that will preserve Moore's insight that "our ethical judgments claim objectivity." Russell says our analysis needn't be concerned with the relatively minor question of goodz z 's alleged simplicity, but it must preserve this claimed objectivity of our value judgments. On such an analysis, "allz propositions in which the word 'good' has a primary occurrence are false"-provided, he says, "we deWne it ['good'] as nearly as possible in accordance with the usage of absolutistsz ".
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Here we have, I think, another, and crucially important, rulez -z apparently unnoticed by Pigdenz -z for a proper analysis of goodz z :
Russell's Elimination Rule 2z : The predicate goodz is to be an incomplete symbol deWned in context as nearly as possible in accordance with the usage of the [Moorean] absolutists.
Put simply, it means that the symbol for goodz is to be a description which purports to denote something approximating the Moorean good, i.e. a property which, at least, is objective, and non-natural.
17 Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1903), p. 30; Ethics, pp. 40-3. 18 Pigden, "Russell's Moral Philosophy", http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russellmoral/, sec. 8. 19 Ibid. In My Philosophical Development, Russell says he's long maintained a principle which he thinks still valid: "… if we can understand what a sentence means, it must be composed entirely of words denoting things with which we are acquainted or deWnable in terms of such words" (MPD, p. 169). Now let's return to Pigden's criticism and ask if the situation that he describes could actually arise in (5) or (6). Could M instantiate both good and bad, i.e. the special Moorean properties purportedly denoted by descriptions fashioned in accordance with Russell's two elimination rules? Recall that Pigden's criticism claims the compatibility of "good" and "bad" in the case where the described properties are assumed to actually exist. I think it's clear from the logic of Moore's use of "good" and "bad" in Principia Ethicaz and elsewhere that, as regards intrinsic value, it's necessarily true that M is good only if M is not bad.
17 So, if the special absolutist property that my "good" purports to denote were to be instantiated by M, then, contrary to what Pigden claims, the special absolutist property that your "bad" purports to denote could notz also be so instantiated.
Second objection: the problem of non-naturalness
In his most recent article on Russell's ethics, Pigden gives less weight to his earlier (Wrst) objection. He now claims that the main problem, and one which Russell himself felt weighty enough to cause him to abandon the error theory, is the alleged incongruity of non-naturalness with Russell's Fundamental Principle of Acquaintance. Given Russell's theory of meaning, he … cannot make sense of predicates that are not deWnable in terms of things with which we are acquainted. Thus on the assumption … that "good" cannot [be] deWned in terms of the things with which we arez acquainted (which seems pretty plausible if it is not equivalent to any naturalistic predicate) then we cannot even understandzz the predicate "good" … if it is construed as a descriptive predicate whose function is to denote a property (whether real or non-existent).
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Thus, says Pigden, to keep his error theory Russell would have been required to give up his "fundamental principle" of acquaintance.
19 It was something he was not willing to do. 20 Moore had a lot to say about non-natural properties, and highly intelligible too, at least if you read Herbert Hochberg's account. See Hochberg's "Moore's Ontology and Nonnatural Properties", in E.yD. Klemke, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of G.yE. Moore (Evanston: Northwestern U. P., 1969), pp. 95-127. This seems to misunderstand both Russell's error theory and his fundamental principle. Russell's error theory did not require him to deWne good in a way that conXicted with his fundamental principle. What it required was a deWnition (analysis) of "Xz is good" to be achieved with the help of a description which was, in accordance with Rules 1 and 2, suitable to denote an absolutist Moorean property, were it to exist. And that descriptive requirement would seem to be fulWlled by something like "the Moorean property called 'good' which we claim to see as shared by all our objects of approvaly". It's true that "Moorean" is to be understood as including "non-natural", but there seems to be no reason why this too cannot be understood by a description in terms of words for objects of acquaintance, or deWnable in terms of such words, in the same way that Russell allowed that statements about particulars unknowable by acquaintance are understood, e.g. Russell's physical objects in the Problems. 20 Properties that can't be given in acquaintance (assuming nonnaturalness to be such) needn't be any less describable than physical objects that can't be so given.
Conclusion: why Russell abandoned his new theory
So why did Russell give up his error theory? I think the main reason has to do with Russell's notion of what constitutes a good analysis. The error theory was presented, not so much as the best analysis of moral discourse, but as the best analysis of what our ordinary moral discourse actually means. So if what's needed is to provide an analysis of our ordinary (absolutist) moral discourse, the analysis provided by Russell's error theory is a good one, perhaps even brilliant. But if we think, as Russell did, that good philosophical analysis should sometimes revise our ordinary language and tell us, not so much what we do mean by X, but what we ought to mean, the error theory may come up short, especially if what we ought to mean is something other than a pack of falsehoods. After all, if there are notz any absolutist properties, then we ought not to say there are. For Russell, moral discourse was an important part of human life, and he must have felt more than a little discomfort about the idea of placing such importance on something that was-according to the error theory-productive of nothing but falsehoods. A new, better analysis was needed.
The error theory did make clear that the practical business of our moral discourse is intimately connected with our emotional life and our attitudes of approval and disapproval, regardless of whether there are any absolutist moral properties. But a better metaethical theory would (1) guarantee meaningfulness for our moral language and at the same time (2) avoid the assertion of falsehoods by replacing the statemental errormaking function of the indicative moodz with an emotive non-error-making emotive function in the optative mood, even if it ruled out moral truth. Such a metaethical emotivism would allow Russell to keep the best of the error theory without consigning all moral talk to the realm of error. In 1922, although Russell's ideas about value judgments had already been evolving towards such a theory for nearly a decade, it would be until 1935 before he would settle on a mature version of such an emotivism in his well-known and important Religion and Science.
